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In the emerging literature on judgment (as opposed to preference) aggregation, expert rights
or liberal rights have not been investigated yet. When a group forms collective beliefs, it
may assign experts with special knowledge on certain propositions the right to determine
the collective judgment on those propositions; and, when a group forms collective goals or
desires, it may assign individuals specially aﬀected by certain propositions similar rights on
those propositions. We identify a problem similar to, but more general than, Sen’s ‘liberal
paradox’: Under plausible conditions, the assignment of such rights to two or more individuals
(or subgroups) is inconsistent with the unanimity principle, whereby propositions accepted by
all individuals must be collectively accepted. So a group respecting expert or liberal rights on
certain propositions must sometimes overrule its unanimous judgments on others. The incon-
sistency does not arise if either diﬀerent individuals’ rights are ‘disconnected’ or individuals
are ‘agnostic/tolerant’ or ‘deferring/empathetic’ towards other individuals’ rights. Our ﬁnd-
ings have implications for the design of mechanisms by which groups (societies, committees,
expert panels, organizations) can reach decisions on systems of interconnected propositions.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Suppose the individual members of a group each make judgments on some intercon-
nected propositions. For instance, three members of a committee make judgments on
the following three propositions:
a : Carbon dioxide emissions are above the threshold x.
b : There will be global warming.
a → b : If carbon dioxide emissions are above the threshold x, then there will be
global warming.
One individual accepts a, a → b and b; another accepts a, but rejects both a → b
and b; a third accepts a → b, but rejects both a and b. How can the group aggregate
these individual judgments into corresponding collective judgments? This problem
— ‘judgment aggregation’ — is non-trivial, as our example illustrates. A majority
accepts a,am a j o r i t ya c c e p t sa → b, and yet a majority rejects b, an inconsistent
set of judgments. So ‘propositionwise majority voting’ — one possible aggregation
method — does not guarantee a consistent collective set of judgments. Drawing on
earlier examples of such inconsistencies in multi-member court decisions (Kornhauser
and Sager 1986), Pettit (2001a) has argued that groups making collective judgments
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to the individual judgments on every proposition and collective consistency.
Judgment aggregation allows several interpretations. On a ‘belief’ interpretation,
as in the example above, the set of propositions accepted by an individual or a group
is interpreted as the set of propositions believed by the individual or group to be true.
Under a ‘desire’ interpretation, as illustrated further below, it is interpreted as the
set of propositions desired to be true. Several recent papers have developed general
models of judgment aggregation, proved some impossibility results (List and Pettit
2002; Pauly and van Hees 2003; Dietrich 2003) and possibility results (Bovens and
Rabinowicz 2004; List 2003, 2004a; Dietrich 2003), and explored the parallels and
disanalogies to the more familiar problem of preference aggregation in the tradition
of Condorcet and Arrow (Chapman 1998, 2002; Brennan 2001; Ferejohn 2003; List
and Pettit 2004).2
In this paper, we address an important aspect that has not been investigated yet.
Sometimes a group assigns special rights to particular individuals or subgroups to be
decisive on certain propositions. When a group forms collective beliefs (i.e. determines
what propositions it considers true), a particular individual or subgroup may have
special knowledge or expertise on some proposition, and the group may therefore
assign to that individual or subgroup the right to determine the collective judgment
on that proposition (an expert right). For instance, legislatures or committees may
grant expert rights to certain subcommittees to draw on their specialization and
expertise, or to achieve a division of labour. When a group forms collective goals or
desires (i.e. determines what propositions it wants to make true by collective action),
a particular individual or subgroup may be specially aﬀected by the judgment on some
proposition, such as when the proposition concerns an individual’s private sphere or
a minority group’s condition. Here, too, the group may assign to the individual or
subgroup the right to determine the collective judgment on that proposition (a liberal
right).
What does the assignment of expert rights or liberal rights imply for judgment
aggregation? We prove a result similar in spirit to Sen’s famous ‘liberal paradox’ on
preference aggregation, the result that certain liberal rights conﬂict with the Pareto
principle (Sen 1970), which has recently received renewed interest among political sci-
entists (e.g. Dowding and van Hees 2003; Pettit 2001b, 2003). Speciﬁcally, we prove
that, in judgment aggregation, under plausible conditions, the assignment of expert
rights or liberal rights to two or more individuals (or subgroups) (on one proposition
each) is inconsistent with another plausible principle, namely that, if all individuals
unanimously accept some proposition, then that proposition should also be collect-
ively accepted. Therefore a group respecting the expert rights or liberal rights of two
or more of its members (or subgroups) on certain propositions may sometimes have to
overrule its unanimous judgments on other propositions.3 For example, a legislature
or committee that assigns expert rights to two or more subcommittees on certain is-
sues may be unable to respect its unanimous judgments, at plenary sessions, on other
2The problem of judgment aggregation is also formally related to the problem of aggregating
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3Since the rights-bearers are members of the group themselves, the unanimous judgments that
may have to be overruled are shared by those rights-bearers too.
2issues — although those judgments are endorsed even by the expert subcommitees
themselves.
The problem identiﬁed here is distinct from Sen’s original result, as it concerns
the aggregation of judgments over multiple interconnected propositions rather than
preferences and therefore sheds light on a diﬀerent class of decision problems. In
particular, our results highlight a problem that committees and other collective or-
ganizations with expert members or specialist subcommittees may face when making
collective decisions on complex systems of propositions. The formal proofs of our
results are stated in the appendix.
2T w o e x a m p l e s
We present two examples, one on the belief interpretation of judgment aggregation
and the other on the desire interpretation. The ﬁrst example is inspired by an example
given in Pauly and van Hees (2003), the second by Sen’s original ‘liberal paradox’
example, though both examples are somewhat diﬀerent from these earlier ones. Also,
neither of our examples can be formalized in a preference aggregation framework; in
particular, logical connections of the form a → b or l → p require a propositional
logic representation.
Example 1: expert rights. Suppose a committee has to make judgments on the
factual propositions a, a → b and b, as in the global warming example above. Half
of the committee members are experts on a, the other half experts on a → b.S ot h e
committee assigns to the ﬁrst half the right to determine the collective judgment on
a and to the second a similar right on a → b. The committee’s constitution further
stipulates that unanimous judgments within the committee must be respected. Now
suppose that all the experts on a judge a to be true, and all the experts on a → b
judge a → b to be true. By the expert rights, the committee accepts both a and
a → b. We may therefore expect that the committee also accepts b. However, when
a vote is taken on b, all committee members reject b. How can this happen? Table 1
shows the committee members’ judgments on all propositions.
a a → b b
Experts on a True False False
Experts on a → b False True False
Table 1: A paradox of expert rights
The experts on a accept a, but reject a → b and b.T h ee x p e r t so na → b accept
a → b, but reject a and b. So all committee members are individually consistent.
Nonetheless, respecting the rights of the a-experts on a and of the a → b-experts on
a → b is inconsistent with respecting the committee’s unanimous judgment on b.T o
achieve consistency, the committee must either restrict the expert rights or overrule
its unanimous judgment on b.
Example 2: liberal rights. Imagine a society of two individuals, Lewd and Prude,
3who each have a personal copy of the book Lady Chatterley’s Lover.4 Consider three
propositions:
l :L e w dr e a d st h eb o o k .
p : Prude reads the book.
l → p : If Lewd reads the book, then so does Prude.
Lewd desires not only to read the book himself, but also that, if he reads it,
then Prude should read it too, as he anticipates that his own pleasure of reading the
book will be enhanced by the thought of Prude ﬁnding the book oﬀensive. Prude, by
contrast, desires not to read the book, and also that Lewd should not read it either,
as he fears that the book might corrupt Lewd’s moral outlook. However, in the event
of Lewd reading to book, Prude desires to read it too, so as to be informed about the
dangerous material Lewd is exposed to. Table 2 shows Lewd’s and Prude’s desires
on the propositions.
l p l → p
Lewd True True True
Prude False False True
Table 2: A paradox of liberal rights
Society assigns to each individual the liberal right to determine the collective de-
sire on those propositions that concern only the individual’s private sphere. Since l
and p are such propositions for Lewd and Prude, respectively, society assigns to Lewd
the right to determine the collective desire on l, and to Prude a similar right on p.
Further, according to society’s constitution, unanimous desires of all individuals must
be collectively respected. But now, by Lewd’s liberal right on l, l is collectively ac-
cepted; by Prude’s liberal right on p, p is collectively rejected; and yet, by unanimity,
l → p is collectively accepted — an inconsistent collective set of desires. To achieve
consistency, society must either restrict the liberal rights of the individuals or relax
its constitutional principle of respecting unanimous desires.
3 The model
In this section we introduce the main components of our model of judgment aggreg-
ation (similar to other judgment aggregation models in the literature, e.g. List 2003,
2004a, Pauly and van Hees 2003).
The individuals. We consider a group of individuals, labelled 1, 2,...,n(n ≥ 2).
The propositions. The propositions on which the group makes judgments are
represented in standard propositional logic, L, with connectives ¬ (‘not’), ∧ (‘and’),
∨ (‘or’), → (‘implies’), ↔ (‘if and only if’).5 Propositions are generally denoted p, q,
4While in Sen’s original example there is only one copy of the book — to be borrowed and read
by at most one individual — in our example there are two copies; so the book may be read by both
individuals, or just by one, or by none.
5Formally, the set of all propositions in L is deﬁned by three rules. Let there be a set of symbols
a, b, c,. . .c a l l e dpropositional letters. (i) The letters a, b, c, ... are each propositions (atomic
propositions). (ii) If p and q are propositions, then so are ¬p, (p ∧ q), (p ∨ q), (p → q), (p ↔ q)
4r, ... A truth-value assignment is a function assigning the value ‘true’ or ‘false’ to
each proposition in L, with standard properties.6 A set of propositions S is consistent
if there exists a truth-value assignment under which all propositions in S are true;
S entails ap r o p o s i t i o np (written S ² p) if, for every truth-value assignment under
which all propositions in S are true, p is also true.
The agenda. Now the agenda is a non-empty subset X ⊆ L, interpreted as the
set of propositions on which judgments are to be made. For simplicity, we assume
that X does not contain any double-negated propositions (¬¬p), and X consists of
proposition-negation pairs in the following sense: If p ∈ X,t h e na l s o∼ p ∈ X,w h e r e
∼ p :=
½
¬p if p is not of the negated form ¬q,
q if p is of the negated form ¬q.
We also assume that X contains no tautologies or contradictions (so the proposi-
tions are ‘open’).7 In example 1 above, the agenda is X = {a,b,a → b,¬a,¬b,¬(a →
b)}; in example 2, it is X = {l,p,l → p,¬l,¬p,¬(l → p)}.
Connectedness. As indicated above, judgment aggregation is made non-trivial by
the interconnections between the propositions. We here assume that the propositions
in the agenda are connected in the following technical sense. Two propositions p,q ∈
X are connected (in X) if there exists a minimal inconsistent subset Y ⊆ X that
contains p or ∼ p and contains q or ∼ q.8 Now the agenda X is connected if any two
propositions p,q ∈ X are connected.
The agendas in examples 1 and 2 above are each connected. For example, pro-
positions l and p in the agenda of example 2 are connected as they are contained in
the minimal inconsistent subset {l,p,¬(l → p)}. But if the proposition l → p (and
its negation) were removed from that agenda, then l and p (and hence the agenda)
would no longer be connected. Several other agendas discussed in the literature on
judgment aggregation are also connected, including the agendas of conjunctive or
(compound propositions). (iii) There are no other propositions. For notational simplicity, we always
drop the external ()-brackets around a proposition.
6For any p,q ∈ L, ¬p is true if and only if p is false; (p ∧ q) is true if and only if both p and q are
true; (p ∨ q) is true if and only if at least one of p or q is true; (p → q) is true if and only if it is not
the case that [p is true and q is false]; (p ↔ q) is true if and only if p and q are both true or both
false.
7In fact, our impossibility theorems below require only that the agenda contains at least one
proposition that is neither a tautology nor a contradiction, and our possiblity theorems require no
such assumption at all. However, in the impossibility theorems the so modiﬁed agenda assumption
is only apearently weaker. These theorems also assume the agenda to be connected (see below), in
which case the existence of a single non-tautological and non-contradictory proposition implies that
X contains no tautology (and hence no contradiction, since X contains proposition-negation pairs).
To prove this claim, assume for contradiction that p ∈ X is a tautology. We show that X contains
only tautologies or contradictions, violating the existence of a non-tautological and non-contradictory
member of X.L e t q ∈ X.S i n c e X is connected, there exists a minimal inconsistent set Y ⊆ X
and propositions p
∗ ∈ {p,∼ p} and q
∗ ∈ {q,∼ q} such that p
∗,q
∗ ∈ Y. Since p is a tautology, p
∗ is
either a tautology or a contradiction. But p
∗ cannot be a tautology, since otherwise Y would not be
minimal inconsistent. So p
∗ is a contradiction. This implies Y = {p
∗}, since otherwise Y would not
be minimal inconsistnet. Hence q
∗ = p
∗. So q
∗ is a contradiction, so that q is either a tautology or a
contradiction.
8As e tS is minimal inconsistent if S is inconsistent and every proper subset of S is consistent.
5disjunctive decision problems as in the so-called ‘doctrinal paradox’ or ‘discursive
dilemma’ (Kornhauser and Sager 1986, Pettit 2001a).
Characterizing connectedness. Connectedness can be characterized in terms of
logical dependence. For any propositions p, q and any set of propositions Z,w es a y
that
• p entails q given Z (written p ²Z q)i f{p} ∪ Z ² q;
• p and q are (logically) dependent if p ² q or p ² ¬q or q ² p or q ² ¬p;
• p and q are (logically) dependent given Z if p ²Z q or p ²Z ¬q or q ²Z p or
q ²Z ¬p.
Proposition 1. Two propositions p,q ∈ X are connected (in X)i fa n do n l yi fp,q
are logically dependent given some subset Z ⊆ X consistent with each of p,q,∼ p,∼ q.
So the agenda X is connected if and only if any two propositions p,q ∈ X are
logically dependent given some subset Z ⊆ X consistent with each of p,q,∼ p,∼ q.
In the agenda of example 2, propositions l and p are connected as they are logically
dependent given Z = {l → p}.
Individual judgment sets. Each individual i’s judgment set is a subset Ai ⊆ X.
On a belief interpretation, Ai is the set of propositions believed by individual i to be
true; on a desire interpretation, Ai is the set of propositions desired by individual i
to be true. As a shorthand, we read p ∈ Ai as ‘individual i accepts proposition p’.
A judgment set Ai is consistent if Ai is a consistent set of propositions, as deﬁned
above; Ai is complete (in X) if, for every proposition p ∈ X, p ∈ Ai or ∼ p ∈ Ai.
Unless otherwise stated, we require that individual judgment sets are consistent and
complete. A proﬁle is an n-tuple (A1,...,A n) containing each individual’s judgment
set.
Aggregation rules (constitutions). An aggregation rule (or constitution)i sa
function F that assigns to each admissible proﬁle (A1,...,A n) a single (collective)
judgment set F(A1,...,A n)=A ⊆ X, where we read p ∈ A as ‘the group accepts
proposition p’. The judgment set A can be interpreted as the set of propositions
collectively believed to be true, or as the set collectively desired to be true. The set
of admissible proﬁl e si sc a l l e dt h edomain of F, denoted Domain(F). In the next
section we impose minimal conditions on aggregation rules.
Examples of propositions in politics. As argued in List (2004a), a model of
judgment aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions allows the represent-
ation of several collective decision problems in politics, including problems of belief
aggregation that cannot be represented in a standard preference aggregation model.
Proposals oﬀered for acceptance or rejection in political decisions are instances of pro-
positions. Also, constraints between diﬀerent proposals, such as budget constraints,
can be represented as propositions involving logical connectives; for instance, if the
implementation of any two of the proposals p, q and r is ﬁnancially feasible, but the
joint implementation of all three is too costly, this can be captured by the proposition
6¬(p∧q ∧r). To give further examples, if p is some proposal and a some amendment,
then the proposal with the amendment can be represented as the proposition p ∧ a.
The claim that some action a is a necessary condition for some political goal g can be
represented as the proposition g → a. Claims about how diﬀerent political proposi-
tions constrain each other, which are frequently made in political debate, can also be
represented as propositions involving logical connectives.
4 An impossibility result
We ﬁrst state an impossibility result on the assignment of expert rights or liberal
rights to individuals; we then state a similar result on the assignment of such rights
to subgroups. The rights (expert or liberal) of individuals or subgroups are formalized
by an appropriate concept of ‘decisiveness’. Our account can be seen as the judg-
ment aggregation counterpart of Sen’s original account of rights in terms of decisive
preference (Sen 1970).
Individual rights. U n d e ra na g g r e g a t i o nr u l eF, individual i is decisive on some
proposition p ∈ X if i determines the collective judgment on p and ∼ p;s p e c i ﬁcally, for
every proﬁle (A1,...,A n) ∈ Domain(F),[ p ∈ F(A1,...,A n) if and only if p ∈ Ai]a n d
[∼ p ∈ F(A1,...,A n) i fa n do n l yi f∼ p ∈ Ai]. So, on our account, an individual has a
right on some proposition if the individual is decisive on that proposition. Note that
(i) the second biconditional is redundant in case all individual or collective judgment
sets accepted or generated by F are complete and consistent (i.e. contain exactly
one member of each proposition-negation pair); (ii) decisiveness on p is equivalent to
decisiveness on ∼ p.
Suppose we want to ﬁnd an aggregation rule with the following properties:
Universal Domain. The domain of F, Domain(F), is the set of all logically
possible proﬁles of complete and consistent individual judgment sets.
Minimal Individual Rights. There exist (at least) two individuals who are
each decisive on (at least) one proposition in X.
Unanimity Principle. For any proﬁle (A1,...,A n) ∈ Domain(F) and any
proposition p ∈ X,i fp ∈ Ai for all individuals i,t h e np ∈ F(A1,...,A n).
Like Sen’s (1970) condition of minimal liberalism, minimal individual rights is
a weak requirement that does not even specify which individuals have any decis-
iveness rights and to which propositions these rights apply. However, by using an
undemanding rights requirement, our impossibility result becomes stronger. Below
we introduce an explicit rights system and state a stronger rights requirement. The
following theorem holds.
Theorem 1. Let the agenda X be connected. Then there exists no aggregation
rule (generating consistent collective judgment sets) that has universal domain and
satisﬁes minimal individual rights and the unanimity principle.
7So a group (society, committee, legislature) whose constitution accepts all proﬁles
of individual judgment sets in the universal domain as admissible cannot both assign
(liberal or expert) rights to more than one individual and respect the unanimous
judgments of its members (reached, for instance, at its plenary meetings). Let us
make some remarks about theorem 1.
• This impossibility holds although we do not require collective judgment sets to
be complete; the only collective rationality requirement is consistency.
• The theorem continues to hold if decisiveness in minimal individual rights is
weakened to positive decisiveness. Individual i is positively decisive on p ∈ X if,
for every proﬁle (A1,...,A n) ∈ Domain(F), [p ∈ Ai implies p ∈ F(A1,...,A n)]
and [∼ p ∈ Ai implies ∼ p ∈ F(A1,...,A n)].
• The theorem also continues to hold if F is required to generate consistent
and complete judgment sets and decisiveness in minimal individual rights is
weakened to either negative decisiveness or weak decisiveness. Individual i is
negatively decisive (or has veto power) on p ∈ X if, for every proﬁle (A1,...,A n)
∈ Domain(F), [p/ ∈ Ai implies p/ ∈ F(A1,...,A n)]a n d[ ∼ p/ ∈ Ai implies
∼ p/ ∈ F(A1,...,A n)]. Individual i is weakly decisive on p ∈ X if, for every
proﬁle (A1,...,A n) ∈ Domain(F), [p ∈ F(A1,...,A n) if and only if p ∈ Ai]
(no requirement on ∼ p).
• Without assuming a connected agenda, a modiﬁed result holds in which minimal
individual rights is strenghened to the requirement that there exist (at least)
two individuals who are each decisive on (at least) one proposition in X such
that these two propositions are connected.
Subgroup rights. A subgroup is a non-empty set of individuals M ⊆ {1,...,n}.
Under an aggregation rule F, a subgroup M is decisive on a proposition p ∈ X
if, for every proﬁle (A1,...,A n) ∈ Domain(F), [p ∈ Ai for all i ∈ M implies p ∈
F(A1,...,A n)]a n d[ p/ ∈ Ai for all i ∈ M implies p/ ∈ F(A1,...,A n)]a n dt h et w o
analogous implications with p replaced by ∼ p hold. Note that (i) M is decisive on
p if and only if M is decisive on ∼ p, and (ii) if M contains only a single individual
i, then the deﬁnition of decisiveness of M = {i} on p is equivalent to our earlier
deﬁnition of decisiveness of individual i on p.
In the interest of strength of the next impossibility theorem, we have deﬁned a
weak form of subgroup decisiveness: a subgroup determines the collective judgment
on a proposition p only when the subgroup unanimously agrees on p. Stronger forms
of subgroup rights on p are of course imaginable. A subgroup’s right on p,p r o p e r l y
understood, might also involve the right to determine the collective judgment on p
by a majority vote within the subgroup.
However, are there any aggregation rules under which two or more subgroups are
decisive at least in the present undemanding sense? Suppose we want to ﬁnd an
aggregation rule that satisﬁes the following condition:
Minimal Subgroup Rights. There exist (at least) two disjoint subgroups that
are each decisive on (at least) one proposition in X.
8Here two subgroups are disjoint if they have no members in common. Note also
that minimal subgroup rights is logically less demanding than minimal individual
rights, as minimal individual rights implies minimal subgroup rights (take subgroups
containing a single individual) but not vice-versa (unless n =2 ). The following
theorem holds.
Theorem 2. Let the agenda X be connected. Then there exists no aggregation
rule (generating consistent collective judgment sets) that has universal domain and
satisﬁes minimal subgroup rights and the unanimity principle.
So, further to our earlier result, a group (society, committee, legislature) whose
constitution accepts all proﬁles in the universal domain as admissible cannot both
assign (liberal or expert) rights to more than one subgroup (minority, subcommittee,
expert panel) and respect the unanimous judgments of its members. For theorem
2, analogous remarks to the ones given after theorem 1 apply. This includes the
possible relaxation of minimal subgroup rights by only requiring positive decisiveness
of subgroups, or (if collective judgment sets are required to be complete) by only
requiring negative or weak decisiveness of subgroups.9
5 Possibility results
We now consider conditions under which the conﬂict between (expert or liberal) rights
and the unanimity principle does not arise. For simplicity, we focus on individual
rights, but our results can be generalized to subgroup rights too. To state our possib-
ility results, we ﬁrst reﬁne our account of rights. The condition of minimal individual
rights above does not specify which individuals have rights on which propositions.
We now make (liberal or expert) rights explicit by introducing, for each individual i,
as e tRi ⊆ X, called individual i’s right set,w h e r eRi contains proposition-negation
pairs, i.e. if p ∈ X,t h e na l s o∼ p ∈ X.10 The elements of Ri are interpreted as the
propositions that either belong to individual i’s private sphere (liberal rights inter-
pretation) or for which individual i is the expert (expert rights interpretation). The
vector (R1,...,R n) is called a rights system. An aggregation rule respects a rights
system if it satisﬁes the following condition.
Respectance of Rights. Every individual i is decisive on every proposition in
Ri.
9The deﬁnitions of positive, negative, and weak decisiveness of subgroup M on proposition p are
obtained by dropping from the deﬁnition of decisiveness, respectively, the two implications containing
‘/ ∈’, the two implications containing ‘∈’, and the two implications containing ‘∼ p’.
10It is no restriction of generality to assume that the right sets Ri contain proposition-negation
pairs. If Ri did not contain proposition-negation pairs then individual i’s decisiveness on each
proposition in Ri (see respectance of rights below) would still guarantee i’s decisiveness on every
proposition in the enlarged right set R
∗
i := Ri ∪ {∼ p : p ∈ Ri} (because decisiveness on p is
equivalent to decisiveness on ∼ p). So the right set Ri is equivalent to the right set R
∗
i containing
proposition-negation pairs. However, if respectance of rights is weakened to the requirement that
each individual i be positively/negatively/weakly decisive on each proposition in Ri,t h e ni tm a y
b e c o m ei n t e r e s t i n gt oc o n s i d e rr i g h ts e t sRi not containing proposition-negation pairs.
9Under what conditions can this condition be met? We call the rights system
(R1,...,R n) ⊆ X consistent if the sets R1,...,R n are (logically) independent.11 In-
formally, consistency of a rights system means that diﬀerent individuals’ rights never
conﬂict with each other. Without a consistent rights system, respectance of rights be-
comes internally inconsistent, i.e. inconsistent even without the unanimity principle.
More precisely:
Proposition 2. There exists an aggregation rule F (generating consistent and
complete judgment sets) that has universal domain and satisﬁes respectance of rights
if and only if the rights system (R1,...,R n) is consistent.
We are now able to state our possibility results. We address, ﬁrstly, special do-
mains and, secondly, special agendas and rights systems. (For an overview of do-
main restriction approaches in response to the original liberal paradox in preference
aggregation, including preference-based deﬁnitions of ‘empathy’ and ‘tolerance’, see
Sen 1983; see also Craven 1982, Gigliotti 1986.)
Special domains 1: deferring/empathetic judgments. When one individual
accepts (or takes on) the judgments of another, where those judgments concern the
second individual’s right set, we say that the ﬁrst individual defers to the judgments
of the second (if the rights in question are expert rights) or that he or she shows
empathy for those judgments (if the rights in question are liberal rights). Formally:
• An individual i is deferring/empathetic in proﬁle (A1,...,A n) if, for every pro-
position p in the right set Rj of any other individual j 6= i, the judgment set Ai
satisﬁes [p ∈ Ai if and only if p ∈ Aj].12
• Ap r o ﬁle (A1,...,A n) is deferring/empathetic if every individual i is defer-
ring/empathetic in it.
• Ap r o ﬁle (A1,...,A n) is minimally deferring/empathetic if some individual i is
deferring/empathetic in it.
Deferring/empathetic proﬁles require a unanimous agreement on every proposi-
tion in some individual’s right set, a strong restriction on a proﬁle. Our possibility
theorem, however, is based on the less demanding restriction of minimally defer-
ring/empathetic proﬁles.
Minimally Deferring/Empathetic Domain. The domain of F, Domain(F),
is the set of all minimally deferring/empathetic proﬁles of complete and consistent
individual judgment sets.
If more than one individual has a non-empty right set, the minimally defer-
ring/empathetic domain is a proper subset of the universal domain.13
11Formally, R1,...,R n are independent here if B1 ∪···∪Bn is consistent whenever B1,...,B n are
consistent subset of R1,...,R n, respectively.
12Equivalently, Ai ∩ Rj = Aj ∩ Rj for all j 6= i.
13If there exists only a single individual i with Ri 6= ∅ (i.e. only one individual has a non-empty
right set), then i is trivially deferring/empathetic in every proﬁle; and if there exists no individual i
with Ri 6= ∅ for no individual i (i.e. no individual has a non-empty right set), then every individual
is trivially deferring/empathetic in every proﬁle. So, if Ri 6= ∅ for at most one individual i,t h e nt h e
minimally deferring/empathetic domain coincides with the universal domain.
10Theorem 3. There exists an aggregation rule (generating consistent and com-
plete collective judgment sets) that has the minimally deferring/empathetic domain
and satisﬁes respectance of rights and the unanimity principle.
Let us make some remarks about this possibility result.
• The result holds for any agenda, however rich or sparse the interconnections
between propositions are.
• As shown in our proof, the possibility is established, for instance, by deﬁning
the collective judgment set as the judgment set of some deferring/empathetic
individual. Note that this is never a dictatorial rule since diﬀerent proﬁles (in the
minimally deferring/empathetic domain) have diﬀerent deferring/empathetic
individuals.
• It may seem surprising that theorem 3 does not require the assumption of a con-
sistent rights system (R1,...,R n).I f(R1,...,R n) is inconsistent, how could a
single deferring/empathetic individual prevent the other individuals from ex-
ercising their rights in a mutually inconsistent way, leading to an inconsistent
collective judgment set by respectance of rights? The simple answer is that
individual i’s deferral/empathy does prevent such inconsistencies, albeit in a
rather technical sense. Inconsistencies in the exercise of the other individuals’
rights would (by the deﬁnition of deferral/empathy) lead individual i to have
an inconsistent judgment set Ai, something excluded by the minimally defer-
ring/empathetic domain. But this is puzzling, since it could be interpreted as
meaning that the individuals j 6= i are restricted in the exercise of their rights
so as to allow individual i to be both deferring/empathetic and consistent. One
might, therefore, want to redeﬁne a deferring/empathetic individual as one who
adopts the other individuals’ judgments (where they have rights) unless these
judgments are mutually inconsistent.14 Under this modiﬁed deﬁnition, theorem
3 continues to hold provided that the rights system (R1,...,R n) is consistent.
Special domains 2: agnostic/tolerant judgments. When one individual makes
no judgment on those propositions that lie within another individual’s right set, we
say that the ﬁrst individual is agnostic about the judgments of the second (if the rights
in question are expert rights) or that he or she is tolerant towards those judgments (if
t h er i g h t si nq u e s t i o na r el i b e r a lr i g h t s ) .S p e c i ﬁcally, an agnostic/tolerant individual
i makes no judgment about a proposition in the right set Rj of any other individual
j 6= i, but moreover i’s judgment set Ai does not entail any judgment about any
p ∈ Rj,i . e .Ai is consistent with p and with ∼ p. However, even consistency of Ai
with every particular possible judgment of another individual j 6= i over a proposition
in Rj is not all we require from an agnostic/tolerant individual i.W er e q u i r eAi to
be consistent with every combination of possible judgments by individuals j 6= i on
propositions in Rj. In short, Ai must be consistent with any possible (consistent)
exercise of rights by other individuals. Formally:
14Formally, individual i is deferring/empathetic in proﬁle (A1,...,A n) if [Ai ∩ Rj = Aj ∩ Rj for
all j 6= i] whenever ∪j6=i[Aj ∩ Rj] is consistent.
11• An individual i with judgment set Ai is agnostic/tolerant if Ai is consistent
with every consistent set of the form B1 ∪···∪Bi−1 ∪Bi+1 ∪···∪Bn,15 where,
for each individual j 6= i, Bj ⊆ Rj.
• Ap r o ﬁle (A1,...,A n) is agnostic/tolerant if every individual i is agnostic /
tolerant in it.
• Ap r o ﬁle (A1,...,A n) is minimally agnostic/tolerant if some individual i is
agnostic/tolerant in it.
Our possibility theorem requires only minimally agnostic/tolerant proﬁles.
Minimally Agnostic/Tolerant Domain. The domain of F, Domain(F), is
the set of all minimally agnostic/tolerant proﬁles of consistent individual judgment
sets.
The minimally agnostic/tolerant domain does not require complete judgment sets,
and hence is not a subset of the universal domain. In fact, an agnostic/tolerant
individual i cannot have a complete judgment set (unless all other individuals j 6= i
have an empty right set), since agnosticism/tolerance forces individual i to make
no judgment on (at least) those propositions in other individuals’ right sets. If at
least two individuals have a non-empty right set, then the universal domain neither
contains, nor is contained by, the minimally agnostic/tolerant domain.16
Theorem 4. Let the rights system (R1,...,R n) be consistent. Then there ex-
ists an aggregation rule (generating consistent judgment sets) that has the minimally
agnostic/tolerant domain and satisﬁes respectance of rights and the unanimity prin-
ciple.
Comparing this result with our earlier result about the minimally deferring /
empathetic domain, note the following.
• The present result holds for any agenda, but requires a consistent rights system.
• As shown in our proof, the possibility is established, for instance, by deﬁn-
ing the collective judgment set as the union of the judgment set of some ag-
nostic/tolerant individual and the set containing every proposition accepted by
some individual whose right set contains that proposition.
• The aggregation rule may generate incomplete collective judgment sets, since an
individual’s possible incompleteness within his or her right set has to be collect-
ively reﬂected by respectance of rights. However, in theorem 4 we may addition-
ally require complete collective judgment sets if we either weaken respectance
of rights to the requirement that every person i be positively decisive over each
15If the rights system (R1,...,R n) is consistent, the set ∪j6=iBj is always consistent provided that
each Bj is consistent.
16As in the case of deferral/empathy, if Ri 6= ∅ for only one individual i,t h e ni is trivially ag-
nostic/tolerant in every proﬁle; and if Ri 6= ∅ for no individual i, then every individual is trivially
agnostic/tolerant in every proﬁle. Therefore, if Ri 6= ∅ for at most one individual i, then the minim-
ally agnostic/tolerant domain contains the universal domain.
12p ∈ Ri, or restrict the domain to the set of all minimally agnostic/tolerant
proﬁles (A1,...,A n) such that each Ai is consistent and complete within Ri
(i.e. each Ai contains a member of every proposition-negation pair in Ri). In
such a restricted domain, each individual may refrain from making judgments
only outside his or her right set.
Special agendas and rights systems. Instead of restricting the domain, we now
consider special rights systems, namely ones we call disconnected. We have seen in
proposition 2 that consistency of a rights system is suﬃcient for the existence of
aggregation rules that have universal domain and satisfy respectance of rights, yet
the unanimity principle may be violated. We now strenghen the consistency require-
ment on the rights system so as to become suﬃcient for the existence of aggregation
rules that have universal domain and satisfy both respectance of rights and the un-
animity principle. The rights system (R1,...,R n) is disconnected (in X)i ft h es e t s
R1,...,R n,X\(R1∪···∪Rn) are (logically) independent.17 This implies in particular
that the rights system is consistent, i.e. that R1,...,R n are independent.
Informally, disconnectedness requires not only that the rights of diﬀerent indi-
viduals never conﬂict with each other, but also that they never conﬂict with any
(collective) judgments on propositions outside any individual’s right sphere. So the
rights of diﬀerent individuals must not be ‘entangled’ with each other or with any
other propositions that fall into the agenda for public consideration. If each indi-
vidual lives on a separate island, where the propositions relevant to each island do
not constrain those relevant to the other islands, then it is possible to construct a dis-
connected rights system, where each individual’s right set includes only propositions
relevant to his or her island.
Proposition 3. The rights system (R1,...,R n) is disconnected (in X)i fa n d
only if the right sets R1,...,R n are pairwise disjoint and, for every individual i,n o
proposition in Ri is connected with any proposition in X\Ri.
Note that a disconnected rights system in which more than one individual has
a non-empty right set can exist only if the agenda is not connected. The following
theorem holds.
Theorem 5. If the rights system (R1,...,R n) is disconnected, then there exists
an aggregation rule (generating consistent and complete collective judgment sets) that
has universal domain and satisﬁes respectance of rights and the unanimity principle.
However, while the domain is not restricted — there need not be any defer-
ring/empathetic or agnostic/tolerant individuals — disconnectedness is a severe con-
straint on a rights system, and satisﬁable (if more than one individual is to have a
non-empty right set) only for special agendas.
17Formally, the sets R1,...,R n,X\(R1 ∪ ···∪ Rn) are (logically) independent here if B1 ∪ ···∪
Bn ∪B is consistent whenever B1,...,B n,Bare consistent subsets of R1,...,R n,X\(R1 ∪···∪Rn),
respectively.
136C o n c l u s i o n
We have identiﬁed a paradox in judgment aggregation similar to the famous liberal
paradox in preference aggregation, yet more general since it applies to various prob-
lems of belief or desire aggregation that cannot be represented in a classical preference
aggregation framework. If the propositions on which judgments are to be made are
connected, then, under universal domain, the assignment of (expert or liberal) rights
to two or more individuals (or subgroups) is logically inconsistent with the unanimity
principle whereby a proposition accepted by all individuals should also be accepted
by the group. This is a potential inconsistency between rights and a seemingly un-
demanding democratic principle. For some proﬁles of judgments across the group,
the collective judgment will, of necessity, either violate the (expert or liberal) rights
of some members or subgroups, or fail to respect a unanimous judgment by all group
members. This conﬂict occurs because propositions on which unanimous judgments
are reached are sometimes logically constrained by other propositions that lie in some
individual’s or subgroup’s sphere of rights.
We have also shown that, for the restricted domains of deferring/empathetic judg-
ments or agnostic/tolerant judgments, the inconsistency between rights and the un-
animity principle does not arise. Likewise, for a disconnected rights system, which re-
quires an agenda that is not connected (if there is to be more than one rights-bearer),
the inconsistency does not arise either. So if diﬀerent individuals (or subgroups)
each live on their own Robinson Crusoe island, where the propositions relevant to
diﬀerent islands are not connected with each other, then rights can be assigned to
these individuals (or subgroups) without conﬂicting with the unanimity principle.
But scenarios of this kind are rare, and one may question whether such islanders
would ever face a collective decision problem anyway. Almost all realistic collective
decision problems presuppose some degree of interaction between diﬀerent agents,
which makes it plausible to expect connections between diﬀerent individuals’ right
sets.
Our results have implications for the design of mechanisms that groups (societies,
committees, expert panels, organizations) can use for making decisions on complex
systems of propositions. For certain groups or decision problems, the existence of ag-
nostic/tolerant or even deferring/empathetic group members (in our technical sense)
may avoid the paradox. But there is usually no guarantee that such attitudes will
exist, and so constitutional provisions may be needed to deal with the possible occur-
rence of the paradox. Ultimately, the group faces the constitutional choice between
either relaxing the (democratic) unanimity principle or relaxing (expert or liberal)
rights of individuals or subgroups. Let us brieﬂy discuss each option.
If it is deemed unacceptable to weaken any (expert or liberal) rights of individu-
als (or subgroups), violations of the unanimity principle will have to be allowed in
collective decision making — an option advocated, among others, by Sen (1976) in
the context of preference aggregation. The overruling of unanimous judgments might
be defended on the grounds of ‘unacceptable’ individual motivations behind such
judgments: motivations that disregard the rights of other individuals. Individual
judgments driven by such ‘unacceptable’ motivations may be seen as the counter-
part in judgment aggregation of the so-called meddlesome preferences in preference
aggregation (Blau 1975).
14On the other hand, if the unanimity principle is deemed indispensible, then some
relaxation of (expert or liberal) rights is necessary. One possibility is to grant such
rights in a suitably disconnected way, so that diﬀerent rights never conﬂict with each
other or with unanimous judgments on other propositions. (Here, weaker forms of
disconnectedness than that assumed in theorem 5 might be suﬃcient.) Alternatively,
rights can be made alienable, that is, conditional on not being in conﬂict with any
other rights or unanimous judgments. Dowding and van Hees (2003), for instance,
have suggested that rights may sometimes be overruled by other considerations; in
particular, diﬀerent rights may carry a diﬀerent characteristic threshold of being
respected, where that threshold may vary from right to right and from context to
context.
The choice of whether or not to give rights priority over the unanimity prin-
ciple may also depend on whether these rights are expert rights or liberal rights, i.e.
whether we interpret judgments in terms of beliefs or in terms of desires. Under a
desire interpretation, the choice is ultimately a normative one, which depends on how
much weight we give to individual liberty as a political value relative to other political
values such as certain democratic decision principles. Under a belief interpretation,
by contrast, the choice is not just normative. If there exists a truth of the matter
on the propositions (i.e. they are factually either true or false), then it becomes a
technical epistemological question which aggregation rule is better at tracking that
t r u t h ,o n et h a tr e s p e c t se x p e r tr i g h t s ,o ro n et h a ts a t i s ﬁes the unanimity principle.
The answer to this question — which we cannot provide here — depends on several
factors: how competent the experts are, both on propositions within their area of
expertise and on other propositions, how competent the non-experts are on all these
propositions, and how the judgments of diﬀerent individuals are related to each other
(dependent or independent). The literature on the Condorcet jury theorem can in
principle be modiﬁed so as to address this question (Bovens and Rabinowicz 2004,
List 2004b).
As the liberal paradox continues to be much discussed in the area of preference
aggregation as well as political science more generally, we hope that our ﬁndings will
help to extend this discussion to the emerging research area of judgment aggregation
and to inspire further work not only on liberal rights, but also on expert rights, and
perhaps on combinations between the two.
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A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. Let p,q ∈ X. We show both implications.
(i) First, assume p,q are logically dependent given some subset of X consistent
with each of p,q,∼ p,∼ q. Let Z ⊆ X be a minimal such subset. By assumption,
there exist p∗ ∈ {p,∼ p} and q∗ ∈ {q,∼ q} such that p∗ ²Z q∗. So, the set Y :=
{p∗,∼ q∗} ∪ Z is inconsistent. In fact, Y is even minimal inconsistent (which proves
that p,q are connected):
- {p∗} ∪ Z and {∼ q∗} ∪ Z are consistent since Z is consistent with each of
p,q,∼ p,∼ q;
16- Assume for contradiction that {p∗,∼ q∗}∪Z0 is inconsistent for a proper subset
Z0 ( Z.T h e n p∗ ²Z0 q∗,a n ds op,q are logically dependent given Z0. Also, since
Z is consistent with each of p,q,∼ p,∼ q, so is Z0. This contradicts the minimallity
assumption on Z.
(ii) Now assume that p,q are connected. If q ∈ {p,∼ p}, then p and q are
dependent conditional on the empty set Z = ∅ (which is consistent with each of
p,q,∼ p,∼ q) because p entails q (if q = p)o re n t a i l s∼ q (if q =∼ p). Now assume
q/ ∈ {p,∼ p}. Since p,q are connected, there exist p∗ ∈ {p,∼ p} and q∗ ∈ {q,∼ q}
and minimal inconsistent set Y ⊆ X such that p∗,q∗ ∈ Y .D e ﬁne Z as Y \{p∗,q∗}.
Then p,q are logically dependent given Z,s i n c e{p∗,q∗}∪Z is inconsistent and hence
p∗ ²Z∼ q∗.M o r e o v e r ,Z is consistent with each of p,q,∼ p,∼ q. To show the latter,
we prove that Z is consistent with each of p∗,q∗,∼ p∗,∼ q∗:
- Z ∪ {p∗} is consistent since it is (by p∗ 6= q∗) a proper subset of the minimal
inconsistent set Y = Z ∪ {p∗,q∗}; analogously, Z ∪ {q∗} is consistent;
- Z ∪ {∼ q∗} is consistent, since otherwise Z ² q∗, so that the (already shown)
consistency of Z ∪ {p∗} would remain after adding q∗, i.e. the set Z ∪ {p∗,q∗} would
be consistent; analogously, Z ∪ {∼ p∗} is consistent. ¥
Proof of theorem 1. Assume that X is connected. Suppose that the aggregation
rule F satisﬁes minimal individual rights, the unanimity principle and universal do-
main. We claim that F generates an inconsistent collective judgment set on some
proﬁle. By minimal individual rights there exist two distinct individuals i,j and two
propositions p,q ∈ X such that i is decisive on p and j is decisive on q.
Case q ∈ {p,∼ p}.L e t (A1,...,A n) ∈ Domain(F) be any proﬁle with p ∈ Ai
and ∼ p ∈ Aj; such a proﬁle exists by universal domain (and since p and ∼ p are not
contradictions). Since i and j are each decisive on p,w eh a v ep,∼ p ∈ F(A1,...,A n),
and hence F(A1,...,A n) is inconsistent.
Case q/ ∈ {p,∼ p}.S i n c eX is connected, there exist propositions p∗ ∈ {p,∼ p}
and q∗ ∈ {q,∼ q} and a minimal inconsistent set Y ⊆ X that contains p∗ and q∗.
By the minimal inconsistency of Y, the sets Y \{p∗} and Y \{q∗} are each consistent.
So Y \{p∗} and Y \{q∗} can each be extended to a complete and consistent judgment
set. Let (A1,...,A n) be any proﬁle for which Ai is an extension of Y \{q∗}, Aj is
an extension of Y \{p∗}, and, for all other individuals k/ ∈ {i,j}, Ak is an extension
either of Y \{p∗} or of Y \{q∗}, where all extensions are complete and consistent. By
universal domain, (A1,...,A n) ∈ Domain(F). We show that Y ⊆ F(A1,...,A n),
which completes the proof since F(A1,...,A n) is then inconsistent. First, by the
unanimity principle we have r ∈ F(A1,...,A n) for every proposition r ∈ Y \{p∗,q∗}.
Next, note that by q/ ∈ {p,∼ p} we have p∗ 6= q∗.S op∗ ∈ Y \{q∗} and q∗ ∈ Y \{p∗},
and hence p∗ ∈ Ai and q∗ ∈ Aj. Consequently, since i is decisive on p and j is decisive
on q,w eh a v ep∗,q∗ ∈ F(A1,...,A n). ¥
P r o o fo ft h e o r e m2 .The theorem can be proved by a straightforward adaptation of
the proof of theorem 1. Instead of having two distinct individuals i,j ∈ {1,...,n} each
decisive on some proposition, we now have two disjoint subgroups M,N ⊆ {1,...,n}
each decisive on some proposition. The only adaptation is that, when constructing
proﬁles, the judgment set of individual i in the old proof becomes the judgment set
of each individual in M in the new proof, and the judgment set of individual j in the
old proof becomes the judgment set of each individual in N in the new proof. ¥
17P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n2 .(i) First, assume the rights system (Ri)i=1,...,n is consistent.
For every proﬁle (A1,...,A n) of complete and consistent judgment sets, let
B := B1 ∪ ···∪ Bn,w h e r eBi := Ai ∩ Ri.
Since each Ai is consistent, so is each Bi. So, as the rights system (R1,...,R n) is
consistent, B is consistent, and hence B can be extended to a complete and consistent
judgment set. Let F(A1,...,A n) b ea n ys u c he x t e n s i o n .T h es o - d e ﬁned aggregation
rule F satisﬁes all properties.
(ii) Now assume the aggregation rule F has all properties. To show that the rights
system (R1,...,R n) is consistent, let B1,...,B n be consistent subsets of, respectively,
R1,...,R n. For each i, as Bi is consistent it may be extended to a complete and con-
sistent judgment set Ai. The so-deﬁned proﬁle (A1,...,A n) belongs to the (universal)
domain of F. By acceptance of rights, Bi ∩ F(A1,...,A n)=Bi for all individuals i,
and so
B1 ∪ ···∪ Bn =[ B1 ∩ F(A1,...,A n)] ∪ ···∪ [Bn ∩ F(A1,...,A n)]
=[ B1 ∪ ···∪ Bn] ∩ F(A1,...,A n).
So B1∪···∪Bn is a subset of the consistent set F(A1,...,A n), hence is itself consistent.
¥
Proof of theorem 3. For each minimally deferring/empathetic proﬁle (A1,...,A n),
deﬁne F(A1,...,A n) as the judgment set Ai of some deferring/empathetic individual
i (if there are several such individuals, choose one of them). The so-deﬁned aggreg-
ation rule satisﬁes all conditions, because the collective judgment set, by being the
judment set of a deferring/empathetic individual, is consistent and complete, reﬂects
the judgments of any individual over propositions in the individual’s right set (which
guarantees respectance of rights), and contains each proposition that every individual
accepts (which guarantees the unanimity principle). ¥
P r o o fo ft h e o r e m4 . For every minimally agnostic/tolerant proﬁle (A1,...,A n),
consider the set
B := B1 ∪ ···∪ Bn,w h e r eBi := Ai ∩ Ri.
Since each Ai is consistent, so is each Bi. Hence, by the consistency of the rights
system (R1,...,R n),t h es e tB is consistent. So, as (A1,...,A n) is minimally ag-
nostic/tolerant, there exists an (agnostic/tolerant) individual i such that Ai is con-
sistent with ∪j6=iBj, i.e. such that the set C := Ai∪[∪j6=iBj] is consistent. Note that
C = Ai ∪ B.L e tF(A1,...,A n): =C = Ai ∪ B. The so-deﬁnied aggregation rule F
satisﬁes all properties: F satisﬁes
- minimally agnostic/tolerant domain, and consistent collective judgment sets;
- respectance of rights since, for all minimally agnostic/tolerant proﬁles (A1,...,
An), F(A1,...,A n) ∩ Ri = Ai ∩ Ri for all individuals i;
- the unanimity principle since, for all minimally agnostic/tolerant proﬁles (A1,
..., A n) and each unanimously accepted proposition p ∈ A1 ∩ ···∩ An, this pro-
position belongs in particular to Ai for each agnostic/tolerant individual i, hence to
F(A1,...,A n) by construction of F(A1,...,A n). ¥
18P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3 .(i) Assume the rights system (R1,...,R n) is disconnected.
First, assume for contradiction that the right sets R1,...,R n are not pairwise
disjoint. Then there exist distinct individuals i,j such that Ri∩Rj is non-empty, hence
contains a proposition-negation pair p,∼ p. Take any consistent subsets B1,...,B n,B
of, respectively, R1,...,R n,X\(R1 ∪···∪Rn), such that p ∈ Ri and ∼ p ∈ Rj. Then
B1∪···∪Bn∪B contains both p and ∼ p, hence is inconsistent. So R1,...,R n,X\(R1∪
···∪Rn) are not independent, in violation of the disconnectedness of the rights system
(R1,...,R n). It follows that R1,...,R n are pairwise disjoint.
Next, assume for contradiction that there exist an individual i and a proposition
p ∈ Ri that is connected to a proposition q ∈ X\Ri. Then there exist propositions
p∗ ∈ {p,∼ p} and q∗ ∈ {q,∼ q}, and a minimal inconsistent set Y ⊆ X, such that
p∗,q∗ ∈ Y. Since R1,...,R n a r ep a i r w i s ed i s j o i n t ,t h es e t sB1 := Y ∩ R1,...,B n :=
Y ∩ Rn,B := Y \(R1 ∪ ···∪ Rn) are also pairwise disjoint. So, by p∗ ∈ Bi we have
p∗ / ∈ B1,...,B i−1,B i+1,...,B n,B.Note also that by q∗ ∈ X\Ri we have q∗ / ∈ Bi. As
each of the sets B1,...,B n,Beither does not contain p∗ or does not contain q∗, these
sets are proper subsets of Y . So, as Y is minimal inconsistent, each of B1,...,B n,B
is consistent. Note that B1,...,B n,B are consistent subsets of R1,...,R n,X \(R1 ∪
···∪Rn), respectively. But their union Y = B1 ∪···∪Bn ∪B is inconsistent, so that
R1,...,R n,X \(R1 ∪···∪Rn) are not independent, violating the disconnectedness of
the rights system (R1,...,R n).
(ii) Now assume (R1,...,R n) is not disconnected. We have to show that (a)
the right sets R1,...,R n are not pairwise disjoint, or (b) for some individual i a
proposition q ∈ Ri is connected with a proposition in X\Ri. Showing that (a) or
(b) holds is equivalent with showing that (b) holds in case (a) does not hold. So
suppose that (a) does not hold, i.e. that R1,...,R n are pairwise disjoint. Since
(R1,...,R n) is not disconnected, there exist consistent subsets B1,...,B n,B of, re-
spectively, R1,...,R n,X\(R1∪···∪Rn) such that B1∪···∪Bn∪B is inconsistent. Let
Y be a minimal inconsistent subset of B1 ∪···∪Bn ∪B. Since each of B1,...,B n,B
is consistent, Y is not a subset of any of these sets. So there exist p,q ∈ Y such that
p ∈ Bi and [q ∈ Bj or q ∈ B]( f o rs o m ej 6= i). (By p,q ∈ Y , which is minimal incon-
sistent, p and q are connected.) Hence p ∈ Ri and [q ∈ Rj or q ∈ X\(R1∪···∪Rn)]. If
q ∈ Rj then q/ ∈ Ri since R1,...,R n are pairwise disjoint; and if q ∈ X\(R1∪···∪Rn)
then also q/ ∈ Ri.S op/ ∈ Ri, hence q ∈ X\Ri. This completes the proof, since a pro-
position in Ri (p) is connected with a proposition in X\Ri (q). ¥
Proof of theorem 5. Let the rights system (R1,...,R n) be disconnected. Let
(A1,...,A n) be any proﬁle of complete and consistent judgment sets. By universal
d o m a i n ,e a c ho ft h es e t s
B1 := A1 ∩ R1, ..., B n := An ∩ Rn,B:= (A1 ∩ ···∩ An)\(R1 ∪ ···∪ Rn)
is consistent. Since B1,...,B n,Bare consistent subsets of, respectively, R1,...,R n,
X\(R1 ∪ ···∪ Rn), the disconnectednesss of the rights system (R1,...,R n) implies
that the set C := B1 ∪ ···∪ Bn ∪ B is also consistent. So C m a yb ee x t e n d e dt oa
complete and consistent judgment set. Let F(A1,...,A n) be such an extension. The
so-deﬁn e da g g r e g a t i o nr u l eF has all relevant properties: F satisﬁes
- universal domain, and consistent and complete collective judgment sets;
19- respectance of rights since F(A1,...,A n)∩Ri = Ai∩Ri for all individuals i and
proﬁles (A1,...,A n) ⊆ Domain(F);
- the unanimity principle since, for all proﬁles (A1,...,A n) ⊆ Domain(F), F(A1,
..., A n) contains each proposition p ∈ A1 ∩ ···∩ An, as is seen by distinguishing
between two cases: p ∈ Ri for some individual i (hence p ∈ Ai ∩ Ri), and p/ ∈ Ri for
all individuals i (hence p ∈ (A1 ∩ ···∩ An) \(R1 ∪ ···∪ Rn)). ¥
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